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Abstract-In this article I clarify the concepts of ‘pain’, ‘suffering’. ‘pains of body’, ‘pains of soul’. I explore 
the relevance of an ethic to the clinical setting which gives patients a strong prima facie right to freedom 
from unnecessary and unwanted pain and which places upon medical professionals two concomitant 
moral obligations to patients. First, there is the duty not to inflict pain and suffering beyond what is 
necessary for effective diagnosis. treatment and research. Next, there is the duty to do all that can be done 
to relieve all the pain and suffering which can be alleviated. I develop in some detail that individuality 
of pain sensitivity must be taken into account in fulfihing these obligations. I explore the issue of the 
relevance of informed consent and the right to refuse treatment to the matter of pain relief. And I raise 
the question of what conditions, if anv, should override the right to refuse treatment where pain relief 
is of paramount concern. 
In the clinical setting, medical personnel must con- 
stantly act upon some ethics of pain management. 
Such questions as “Is the patient in pain?” and 
“What can and should we do about it?” cannot be 
evaded by doctors, nurses and other support person- 
nel who must daily live face to face with the bitter 
reality of human injury and illness and their atten- 
dant pains. What does a mere philosopher have to 
contribute to a discussion of the ethics of pain 
management? Although medical professionals obvi- 
ously do so much to help. it may seem at first that 
philosophers have little or nothing to do with the 
bitter realities of human suffering. However, pain is 
a topic of universal human interest, and no one has 
a monopoly on the topic. Historically, philosophers 
have been keenly interested in the topic of pain and 
have much worthwhile to.say about it, as I expect to 
show. 
One legitimate task of philosophy, most agree, is 
the clarification of concepts. In the clinical setting, 
when we ask: “Is the patient in pain?” and “What can 
and should we do about it”, how often do we also ask 
“What do we mean by ‘pain’?” This question is too 
seldom posed, and I suspect that many patients are 
being neglected in our medical institutions partly 
because we attempt to fulfill our personal and profes- 
sional responsibilities to suffering humanity without 
a very clear and sufficiently general concept of pain. 
Perhaps here philosophy can help. It was Epicurus 
who wrote centuries ago that “Vain is the word of a 
philosopher which does not heal any suffering of 
man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it 
does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no 
profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the 
suffering of the mind” [I]. 
PAINS OF BODY AND OF SOUL 
Almost all of the most important Greek philo- 
sophers discoursed and wrote extensively upon the 
topics of pleasure and pain. though only the latter is 
our present concern. Epicurus. Aristippus. Plato and 
Aristotle and innumerable later philosophers have 
recognized an important difference between two 
different classes of pains. variously characterized on 
the one hand as physical, sensory or bodily, and on 
the other hand as mental, spiritual, non-sensory or 
psychological. Typical examples of bodily pains are 
those derived from bodily lesions, infections, cuts, 
bruises, burns, cramps, broken bones, headaches, 
toothaches, stings, etc. Typical examples of mental 
pains are those disagreeable feelings involved in 
depression, anxiety, uncertainty, guilt, grief, bore- 
dom, sadness, sorrow, fear, anger, alienation, lone- 
liness, etc. A number of different ways of 
differentiating conceptually between these two classes 
of pains have been attempted [2], but I am convinced 
that the most adequate way to do it is along phenom- 
enological lines. In my recent book, Pleasure and 
Pains: A Theory of Quaiifative Hedonism 1 develop 
and defend the thesis that the so-called bodily pains 
are those which are given to immediate subjective 
experience as being located in some fairly definite 
place or region of the body. In the grips of localized 
bodily pain, when the doctor asks us “Where does it 
hurt?’ we do not need a sophisticated body-mind 
metaphysics, or an intimate knowledge of anatomy 
or neurology to answer his question. On the other 
hand, when we are experiencing the very real and 
highly objectionable ‘pains of soul’ on our list, the 
question “Where does it hurt?’ has no clear meaning 
[3]. Bodily pains are those which are immediately 
experienced as having bodily locus, whereas spiritual 
pains are those which are immediately experienced as 
non-localized, as having no specific bodily place. This 
is purely a phenomenological distinction and does 
not commit us in any way to any controversial theses 
in metaphysics, etiology, or neurology. On this anal- 
ysis, the so-called ‘psychogenic pains’ felt as having 
bodily locus by the hysteric would count phenom- 
enologically as bodily pains, as would the phantom 
limb pains of the amputee and all so-called ‘referred’ 
and ‘psychosomatic’ pains. We must also recognize 
that mental pains are often accompanied by bodily 
pains. As Rollo May has written: 
acute loneliness seem to be the most painful kind of anxiety 
which a human being can suffer. Patients often tell us that 
the pain is a physical gnawing in their chests, or feels like 
the cutting of a razor in their heart region, as well as a 
515 
516 REM B. EDWARDS 
mental state of feeling like an infant abandoned in a world 
where nobody exists [4]. 
From my reading of contemporary studies dealing 
with current psychological and medical research on 
the topic of pain, it appears that attention is now 
being paid primarily to localized bodily pain. Even 
where causal connections between localized bodily 
pain and the non-localized pains of anxiety, uncer- 
tainty, guilt, loneliness, depression, etc. are acknowl- 
edged. the latter are usually not being called ‘pain’. 
There are’a few interesting exceptions, however. For 
example, in the case of Mrs Abel, the cancer patient 
studied so extensively by Fagerhaugh and Strauss, we 
are told that at one point the nurses “had really 
begun to question the amount.of emotional pain and 
the amount of physical, organic pain” that she was 
suffering [5]. A nurse working on a geriatric ward is 
reported to have said that “We have not so much 
physical pain as the pain of loneliness” [6]. When a 
patient is told by a doctor that he is dying, “the 
announcement. usually leaves the patient very de- 
pressed. To cope with this initial response, the nurses 
stand by with medication to relieve emotional as well 
as physical pain” [7]. 
Innumerable examples of a usage of the word 
‘pain’ sufficiently broad in scope to include mental as 
well as bodily discomforts could be produced from 
the writings of philosophers, doctors and nurses, 
psychologists and plain men. The main reason why 
‘pain’ is narrowly used to cover only localized dis- 
comfort in contemporary research studies seems to be 
that this variety of pain can be easily and cheaply 
produced in the laboratory setting without serious 
danger of permanent injury, by such simple tech- 
niques as applying and gradually increasing elec- 
tricity, pressure. cold, heat, pin pricks and pinches- 
all with a minimum of legal and ethical restraints. It 
is much more difficult experimentally to induce acute 
depression, anxiety. fear, guilt, loneliness, boredom, 
etc., though this is by no means impossible. The real 
problem here is that we commonly acknowledge that 
it is much more questionable ethically to generate 
such pains of soul, and this says something very 
important about the relative disvalues which we tend 
to attach to these two classes of disagreeable feelings. 
We realize at least implicitly that the disagreeable 
feelings in these two classes are qualitatively distinct 
and that they also difTer significantly in intrinsic 
disvalue. acute non-localized pains being of greater 
disvalue somehow than equally acute localized ones. 
If this is recognized in the laboratory setting, the 
application to the clincal setting should be obvious. 
The imperative to assist the patient in gaining relief 
from the unnecessary mental pains arising from his 
illness should be at least as strong as, if not stronger 
than, the imperative to assist in the relief of unneces- 
sary bodily pains. Yet, it is precisely in this area that 
there seems to he the greatest patient neglect. 
It is theoretically possible to produce a general 
definition of ‘pain‘ which covers both the non- 
localized and localized varieties. In my Pkmwres and 
Pains. I define ‘pain‘ in the generic sense as cln.~ 
quality of feeling which we ordinarily desire to elim- 
inate or avoid for its own sake [g]. Both localized and 
non-localized disagreeable feelings qualify as pains 
under this definition. This broad concept of pain is 
perfectly compatible with our usual willingness to 
accept pains which are seen as necessary instrumen- 
tally for the achievement of our long range goals. and 
with our attempts to endure with dignity those pains 
which are unavoidable no matter what anyone does 
to help. The acceptance of necessary pains is in no 
way incompatible with the value judgments that both 
necessary and unnecessary pains are intrinsically bad. 
worth avoiding for their own nasty sake. even when 
the necessary ones must be endured. 
The broad usage of the word ‘pain‘ to cover both 
phenomenologically localized and non-localized dis- 
agreeable feeling has been fairly commonplace 
among philosophers from the time of the ancient 
Greeks. In philosophy, this broad usage has been 
governed by a theoretical interest in having a word 
which will identify and include all those disagreeable 
feelings which it is reasonable to want to avoid and 
eliminate for their own nasty sake where at all 
possible, especially when they make no identifiable 
contribution to our long range personal plan of life. 
Although I am no etymologist, it may (and it may 
not) [9] be true that originally ‘pain’ applied only to 
the localized varieties of disagreeable feeling and that 
the broader usage was a metaphorical extension of 
this. Linguistic innovations eventually can become 
established usage, and thousands of years of the 
broaded usage for ‘pain’ should make for a real 
convention even from the standpoint of ordinary 
language. There is surely some truth in Ivan Illich’s 
insistence that “The technical matter which contem- 
porary medicine designates by the term ‘pain’ even 
today has no simple equivalent in ordinary speech. In 
most languages the term taken over by the doctors 
covers grief, sorrow, anguish, shame and guilt” [IO]. 
Those accustomed to speaking plain English will find 
nothing illegitimate or even confusing about the 
broad usage which I am recommending. I further 
recommend it because I believe that much actual 
harm and neglect to patients results from restricting 
‘pain’ to ‘bodily pain’, for it frequently happens that 
.a patient’s suffering is dismissed as ‘psychological’, 
‘imaginary’ or ‘unreal’ when it is thought not to be 
bodily localized in nature [I I]. Mental hospitals. 
which deal primarily with pains of soul, are the most 
under-funded medical institutions in our society, 
partly because we share the misconception that the 
non-localized pains of mental patients are somehow 
illusory. Those who believe that pains of soul are 
somehow unreal also find it easy to convince them- 
selves that the ethics of pain management does not 
apply to that kind of suffering. 
Lest it be suspected that my primary purpose thus 
far has been merely to promote a new or broader 
word usage for ‘pain’, let me make it clear that I 
really do not care what terminology we choose to 
adopt so long as we recognize that those intense and 
prolonged disagreeable feelings involved in depres- 
sion, anxiety, guilt, fear, alienation, loneliness, uncer- 
tainty, monotony, etc. are great intrinsic evils and 
that those who deal with the sick and injured have 
just as much a moral obligation to help patients cope 
with these as with localized bodily discomforts. Often 
the expression ‘pain and suffering’ is used to 
differentiate between the two classes of pain which I 
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have distinguished, though there is a certain redun- 
dancy here in that ‘suffering’ includes both types of 
pain. However, if we are more comfortable with such 
terminology then so be it. If we do choose to talk that 
way, let us be sure that once we ask “1s the patient 
in pain?’ we immediately add “and is he or she 
suffering?” Suffering in this sense is as real as and 
often worse than pain. Unless this is acknowledged. 
professional responsibilities in the area of managing 
those unnecessary intrinsic disvalues directly gener- 
ated by injury and disease will likely not be fulfilled. 
Without repeating any of the gruesome details, it 
seems to be that the wide prevalence of this sort of 
patient neglect is amply documented and illustrated 
in virtually every chapter of Politics C$ Pain Munuge- 
ment by Fagerhaugh and Strauss [12]. 
INDIVIDUALITY AND THE ETHICS OF PAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
Once we have decided that a patient is in ‘pain 
and/or suffering’, there is a broadly based humanistic 
ethics which applies to the domain of medical care 
which gives patients a strong prima ,facie right to 
freedom from unnecessary pain, and which places 
upon medical professionals two concomitant moral 
obligations to patients. First, there is the duty not to 
inflict additional pain and suffering beyond what is 
absolutely necessary for effective diagnosis, treatment 
and research. Next, there is the duty to do all that can 
be done within the limits of current medical knowl- 
edge and available resources to relieve all the pain 
and suffering which can be alleviated. Attempts to 
fulfill these obligations must be subject to the in- 
formed consent of the patient and must be com- 
patible with the goal of an ultimate restoration to 
health where there is hope of a cure, or with the 
patient’s own plans and desires for living and dying 
where there is no such hope, or with conditions to be 
discussed later that properly override the patient’s 
preferences. I shall not explore the theoretical foun- 
dations of these rights and duties, though I will say 
that they can be derived in one way or another from 
almost every major philosophical theory of ethics 
.available to us. In that sense they are broadly 
justified. 
A few careless, incompetent or sadistic medical 
professionals may occasionally violate the duty not to 
inflict unnecessary pain, but I wish to concentrate 
mainly upon the duty to help relieve unnecessary pain 
(for short). This duty is widely infringed, and some 
of the most interesting problems pertaining to the 
ethics of pain management arise in connection_ 
with it. 
Persons who recognize a duty to help relieve 
unnecessary pain must have a workable solution to 
the problem of knowing other minds. In the philos- 
ophy seminar room, this is an ancient academic 
problem which may be endlessly debated without 
significant outcome: but in the clinical setting the 
question is far more than merely academic. If we 
accept the obligation to help relieve the unnecessary 
pains of others we must be able to determine with 
reasonable accuracy not only r/rat the other is 
suffering but also the quality (kind) and the quantity 
(intensity and duration) of the pain involved. Many 
of the practical disagreements about what to do for 
the suffering patient and when or whether to do 
anything spring from different assessments of the 
kind and degree of pain being experienced. 
Since only the patient knows his pain directly, 
others who would give him aid must somehow solve 
the problem of the connection between subjective 
pain experience and objective pain expression. Every 
hospital contains its share of excessive expressers, 
average expressers and below average expressers of 
pain. Average expressers are usually easily managed 
and cause little trouble or consternation for the staff; 
but enormous headaches and heartaches are created 
by those excessive expressers that I shall call ‘epi- 
cureans’ [13] who may become the “patient of the 
day-or the week-or the month” [14] and by the 
under average expressers who are commonly labeled 
by the philosophical term ‘stoics’ even in the clinical 
setting. 
Clinical decisions about whether and when to give 
more drugs or to use other techniques of pain relief 
turn upon staff assessments of the kind and degree of 
pain being experienced. It is at this point that a 
‘political’ or ethical struggle for pain relief is gener- 
ated between patient and staff. With good reason, we 
commonly refuse to make a simple and direct cor- 
relation between kind and degree of pain expression 
and kind and degree of experienced pain. We know 
that pain expression may vary with such things as 
cultural upbringing, individual differences in verbal 
and other expressive skills, individual assessments of 
what is and is not socially expected and appropriate, 
and individual moral and religious standards of 
behavior. Deliberate attempts at deception must 
also be distinguished from the ‘real thing’ somehow. 
After proper allowances have been made for all these 
factors, one additional variable must be assessed- 
the natural variations from individual to individual in 
susceptibility to pain. This may be both the most 
significant and yet the most neglected of all the 
variables which affect our judgments concerning the 
correlation between experienced pain and pain ex- 
pression. 
Some very exciting and promising research con- 
cerning natural individual variations in susceptibility 
to pain has been done by Asenath Petrie and her 
associates at Harvard Medical School and reported 
upon in her book entitled Indhiduality in Pain and 
Suflering. Petrie began with the following problem, as 
she describes it: “I had been puzzled by the obser- 
vation confirmed by numerous physicians and nurses 
that the same trauma affected people so variously. It 
seemed unlikely that these contrasting reactions to 
pain were based solely on differences in the control 
demanded by the culture or by the individual him- 
self” [ 151. Petrie claims to have discovered, “a neu- 
rological or physiological basis for this variation in 
tolerance for pain” [ 161. As a result of her extensive 
research, Petrie was able to distinguish three types of 
people who differed significantly in the ways in which 
they naturally ‘modulated’ both sensory experience 
and pain experience. She called these “the reducer. 
the augmenter. and the moderate” [17]. By definition, 
“The reducer tends subjectively to decrease what is 
perceived: the augmenter to increase what is per- 
ceived: the moderate neither to reduce nor to aug- 
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ment what is perceived” [18]. Under carefully con- 
trolled and repeatable experimental conditions, a 
tendency to amplify or decrease subjectiveiy experi- 
enced pain caused by the ‘same trauma’ was found to 
be correlated definitively with the tendency to amplify 
or decrease tactile stimuli in other sensory modalities. 
With respect o tactile stimuli this is easily measured 
by allowing the blindfolded experimental subject to 
estimate with one hand the size of a block of wood 
previously held in the other hand. Pain augmenters 
were found to be size augmenters, pain reducers were 
size reducers and pain moderates were size accurates 
[19]. Weight and sound amplification and reduction 
may also be experimentally correlated with this [20]. 
Other important correlations were experimentally 
established which should be of great significance for 
those struggling with the ethics of pain management. 
Brain surgery in the prefrontal areas of the brain 
converts augmenters into reducers [21]. Augmenters 
are much more concerned with ‘the signs and symp- 
toms of ill health’ than reducers [22] and con- 
sequently are more easily persuaded to take pre- 
cautions against injury and avoid such health 
endangering activities as smoking [23]. Reducers are 
more likely to suffer intensely from those ‘mental’ 
distresses correlated with sensory deprivation such as 
monotony [24] and “restlessness and loss of feeling of 
identity and loss of contact with reality” [25]. They 
greatly prefer physical punishment to solitary 
confinement and other forms of social isolation [26] 
and they will inflict bodily pain upon themselves if no 
other way can be found to alleviate the stress of 
monotony [27]. In the clinical setting, they endure 
localized bodily pain extremely well simply because 
they experience much less of it than the typical 
moderate or the super sensitive augmenter, but they 
are also the ones who will suffer the most (both from 
monotony and loneliness presumably) from the social 
isolation, confinement, and enforced inactivity usu- 
ally imposed upon them in the clinical setting [28]. On 
the other hand, augmenters will be most susceptible 
to localized bodily pain because they are equipped by 
nature to experience more of it, but their compen- 
sation is that they will suffer the least from sensory 
deprivation [29]. Without being susceptible to lone- 
liness and monotony, they will be even more sus- 
ceptible to the mental pains of anxiety and depression 
[30], both of which are associated with the introverted 
personality typical of the amplifier [31]. By contrast, 
the reducer will be an extrovert who is physically 
more active [32] and who requires considerably more 
sensory stimulation derived from such sources as 
contact sports, movement, speed, etc. [33] than the 
moderate or the augmenter. The introverted augmen- 
ter will be more interested in books and ideas and will 
make better grades in school [34]. He will also 
typically need fewer but deeper friendships than the 
reducer who needs a greater variety of more 
superficial but active social contacts [35]. The aug- 
menter will be keenly sensitive to the sufferings of 
others, but not the reducer who “cannot empathize 
adequately with experiences that he does not share. 
The extreme reducer fails to understand suffering 
with pain and may inflict it with little compunction” 
[36]. On the whole, the augmenter enjoys a richer 
inner life than the reducer [37]. 
I have summarized some of the more interesting 
findings and correlations which Petrie and her associ- 
ates have been able to establish, but there are many 
others which I have not covered [38], including her 
verdict that there are great individual variations in 
responsiveness to pain control medications and ther- 
apies. If it should be true, as her work seems to show, 
that there are significant natural differences between 
individuals with respect to their susceptibility to 
different kinds and degrees of suffering and their 
responsiveness to relief measures, what differences 
should that make with respect to the duty to help 
relieve unnecessary pain and suffering? 
Epicureans 
Although I do not claim to have all the answers by 
any means, certain conclusions seem to be obvious. 
First of all, we cannot succeed in the project of pain 
relief without taking the individuality of the sufferer 
fully into account. Next, we must recognize that we 
cannot succeed in this project as long as we continue 
as usual to judge all patients by the standard of 
average or moderate sensitivity and responsiveness. 
The credibility of the patient’s pain expression is 
challenged all too often because he makes atypical 
claims to pain experience and makes atypical de- 
mands for pain relief-with little or no attempt to 
determine whether he is a natural pain augmenter. 
moderate or reducer. If he should be an augmenter, 
his needs may indeed be super normal and his above 
average expression of pain behavior may be perfectly 
appropriate. The seemingly inordinate demands 
which he makes for staff time and attention and relief 
measures may be completely justified. This could be 
true especially in light of the fact that localized bodily 
pains and non-localized fears and anxieties tend to 
feed upon and amplify one another. One of the most 
successful techniques available to us for the reduction 
of bodily pain involves helping the patient to reduce 
his pains of soul, and one of the commonest areas of 
patient neglect lies in our failure to give such aid. 
Furthermore, a common area of patient abuse 
consists in staff activities designed to generate pains 
of soul. Challenging the patient’s claims concerning 
the degree of his suffering and/or his need for help 
definitely and gravely affects his moral standing in the 
hospital and broader human community. Such a 
person is tacitly branded as a liar, and he also comes 
to be regarded as somehow cowardly, uncooperative 
and lacking in will power or attention power. Con- 
sequently, he is relegated to the inferior status of 
being a defective moral agent. He may come to be 
labeled as ‘difficult’, ‘demanding’, a ‘clock watcher’, 
‘crock’, ‘malingerer’ or ‘manipulator’. He has what 
Fagerhaugh and Strauss call a ‘spoiled identity’ [40]. 
‘He is addicted’ may be uttered about him with 
varying degrees of contempt [41] and overly expres- 
sive patients may be stereotyped as ‘paranoid’ or 
‘schizophrenic’ [42]. Once the proper degradation 
ceremony has been performed, staff members then 
feel morally justified in stereotyping and humiliating 
the patient, disregarding his pain professions and 
pleas for help, avoiding his room, ignoring his buzzer, 
and generally ostracizing him from the community of 
human moral agents. All these responses are designed 
Pain and the ethics of pain management 519 
to cause the patient to suffer from various pains of 
soul. 
This sort of thing does little to enhance and much 
to destroy the patient’s own feelings of self-esteem. 
Feelings of worthlessness, humiliation, guilt, fear, 
powerlessness, alienation, abandonment. etc. are 
likely to ensue. Medical professionals then become 
inflicters of pain rather than pain relievers. This is not 
to say that staff disapproval and rejection of patients 
is always unjustified, for there doubtless are just as 
many liars and connivers in our hospital beds as there 
are in the general population at large! But it is to say 
that great caution must be exercised in this area, and 
that the degradation activities of staff members must 
be carefully monitored for patient abuse. It is in 
dealing with genuine pain augmenters that the poten- 
tial for such abuse seems to be greatest; and the case 
of Mrs Abel, the cancer patient studied by Strauss 
1431 and Fagerhaugh, seems to illustrate this point 
quite well. Some persons are just natural Epicureans 
who are super sensitive to suffering, just as others are 
natural Stoics who are unusually insensitive. We must 
now give some attention to the latter. 
Stoics 
It is often pointed out that the values of medical 
staff members deeply affect the quality and quantity 
of care that they are willing and able to give. If they 
attach great value to courage, cooperativeness, resig- 
nation and will power, they are very likely to deny 
moral standing to those patients perceived as failing 
to measure up to these stoic values. Furthermore, 
they are very likely to grant special moral standing 
and professional and personal favors to those stoical 
patients who are perceived as exemplifying courage, 
cooperativeness and strength of will. Now I do not 
wish to knock will power, but I would suggest hat 
even here we ought to try to keep track of the 
distinction between natural pain augmenters, mod- 
erates and reducers. If enduring suffering with stoical 
determination and resignation entitles some patients 
to special esteem if not favoritism, we must at least 
distinguish between the pain reducer who is the 
natural stoic who effortlessly seems to exemplify the 
qualities of determination and resignation simply 
because he is actually doing very little suffering, and 
the moral stoic who through great effort of will 
acrual/j~ manages to display these admirable qualities. 
What are our moral duties in the medical setting to 
the stoical patient? First, let us recognize that even 
the natural stoic can and does suffer, though consid- 
erably less than what we would expect of a moderate 
or amplifying patient. When he makes his occasional 
requests for help, his suffering does activate the 
obligation to help relieve unnecessary pain. We 
should further recognize that he is particularly vul- 
nerable to the soul pains of monotony and loneliness 
even when he experiences little bodily pain, and we 
should take appropriate measures to help him cope 
with them. Next. let us recognize that the moral stoic 
may be suffering a great deal more than we are led 
to suspect. Yet he is enjoying certain partially com- 
pensating secondary gains or satisfactions from the 
very effort of courage and will power which he is 
making and from his sense of being.true to his moral 
and;or religious ideals. Understanding this much 
about him, we might wonder if we have a duty to 
offer him medication and whatever means to relief we 
have available. Most of us would agree, I suspect, 
that we at least have a duty to ask him reguhrly if he 
wants help. for we are deeply embarrassed and 
troubled by the story told by Fagerhaugh and Strauss 
Of 
the woman who suddenly demanded to sign herself out 
because for three days she had not been given any pain 
medication, although she had a pm order. The nurse who 
described the transformation of this initially pleasant. placid 
patient was perplexed: “We didn’t know she was in pain; we 
were waiting for her to ask” [44, p. 1221. 
Although waiting around for the stoic to ask for 
medication is much too passive, we might still wonder 
just how active the medical staff should be in encour- 
aging the patient to accept pain relief measures. My 
own judgment is that they should never be so active 
that they actually coerce the patient into violating his 
own deepest moral and religious norms, for the net 
result of that will be insufferable pains of soul such 
as a deep erosion of self-esteem and an influx of 
overwhelming guilt. This will be worse to and for the 
patient than any bodily pains he can endure while he 
regards them as endurable. 
Paternalistic stoicism 
One of the most interesting moral problems to arise 
in connection with stoicism in the clinical setting is as 
follows. Do medical professionals have an obligation 
to try to instill the stoic values of courage, deter- 
mination and resignation in patients who lack them? 
There is no doubt that staff members do in fact often 
require their patients to try to acquire and exemplify 
these prized traits of character. As Fagerhaugh and 
Strauss point out, the nurse often tells the patient: 
“The doctor says you can have the medication in 
three hours, but why don’t you try to wait awhile”; 
and a demanding patient is assigned to staff members 
who are able to “set limits and treat him firmly, like 
a child”. [45, p. 1211. “Nurses will admit that they are 
more sympathetic with the teeth-gritters than with 
the overly expressive patients” [46, p. 1221. 
Now, being something of a natural and moral (i.e. 
by reflection and choice) epicurean myself, I have 
always had my doubts about stoics, whether they be 
natural or moral-especially those who try to force 
us epicureans to be stoics against our will. This is 
especially true where no questions of immediate or 
iong range he&h and happiness are at issue. Epi- 
cureans, to be sure, can and normally do attach a 
great deal of significance to the inherent satisfactions 
of courage, resignation and effortful self-control; and 
they can be persuaded of the long range utility of 
such virtues for the avoidance of future pain. But 
once they have arrived at an informed decision that 
enough is enough, should we then still insist that they 
exemplify courage and resignation just for their own 
stoic sake? I for one have may doubts. 
Aristotle noted that we cannot practice the moral 
virtues unless the proper conditions necessary for 
their realization are provided. Suffering does seem to 
be an essential condition for the actualization of 
certain forms of courage, determination and resigna- 
tion. and perhaps for other moral and spiritual values 
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as well. This being the case, we may ask what exactly 
are the limits of the duty in the medical setting to 
promote those values which may be actualized only 
through suffering, especially when this duty may 
come into conflict with the recognized obligation to 
help relieve unnecessary suffering. This is no moot 
point, for there are prominent authors who castigate 
medical professionals for their efforts to relieve 
suffering on the grounds that they are thereby de- 
priving their patients of the opportunity for spiritual 
or moral growth and responsibility. For example, 
both Ivan Illich [47] and Victor Frank1 [48] have 
intimated that medical personnel have a duty to 
refrain from providing their patients with drugs and 
other technological fixes for pain because doing so 
somehow interferes with the patient’s chances for 
moral or religious self-realization through suffering. 
It is nevertheless extremely difficult to get from such 
moralists of medicine any precise answer to the 
question of what the duties of medical personnel are 
to their patients in that area in which the duty to 
relieve suffering comes into conflict with the ideal of 
soul making. A number of distinct positions are 
possible, even if we grant that some suffering is 
necessary for moral and spiritual self-realization. 
First of all, there is the extreme position that 
instead of relieving suffering, we actually ought to 
irzflict it so that others might grow. Nietzsche justly 
ridiculed such a stance when he wrote: 
If we admit, for example, the truth of the doctrine of 
Schopenhauer (but also of Christianity) concerning the 
redemptive power of suffering, then it becomes regard for 
the ‘general welfare’ not only not to lessen suffering, but 
perhaps even to increase it-not only for oneself but also for 
others. Pushed to this limit, practical ethics becomes ugly- 
even consistent cruelty to human beings [49]. 
I suspect that even the staunchest Stoic and Calvinist 
will balk at such cruelty, and I am convinced that this 
extreme position will be rejected by all humane and 
reflective persons. There should be some important 
differences between a modern doctor and a medieval 
inquisitor. 
Next, there is the position that even if we should 
not inflict suffering, there is at least a duty not to 
relieve my sufering so that the sufferers may grow in 
stoic and other religious virtues. I hope that even this 
position will be too strong for our reflective equi- 
librium; but if not, then we ought at least to agree 
that doctors and nurses who subscribe to it should be 
required to publicize their value commitments, now 
that doctors may advertise. We may imagine such 
newspaper ads as: “_I. Calvin, M.D., General Prac- 
titioner: I let you suffer for your own good”; or 
“Illich. Epictetus and Frankl, Gyn. and Obs., We 
treat Stoics; Epicureans need not apply”. As an 
Epicurean, I certainly would not want to patronize 
such physicians. 
Finally. there is the position that there is at least 
a medical duty not to relieue some pains of soul or 
body so that self-realization through suffering may 
take place. Notice that we are talking about pater- 
nalistic situations where soul making through 
suffering is the sole reason for allowing suffering, not 
about those situations in which the rational epicurean 
could be persuaded to suffer as a necessary means to 
some important personal goals of his or her own. 
Even in the latter cases. doctors and nurses may have 
a selling job to do; but when they fail, should they 
ever appeal to their own stoic values and allow some 
suffering solely for soul making purposes’? If so. 
which particular sufferings and what degree of them 
should they allow? Only God could solve such prob- 
lems, I suspect. I again hope that this modest obli- 
gation would not be embraced by mere mortals. It 
seems to me that even after we have done our best to 
relieve unnecessary and unwanted suffering, sufficient 
pain will always remain for nurturing the soul. In this 
world of woe, God, Mother Nature, The Devil, Fate 
or whatever you want to call it, can be relied upon 
to bless patients with all the anguish they require for 
soul making, especially when such anguish serves no 
rational purposes of their own. Medical professionals 
should leave this kind of paternalistic soul making 
through suffering in the hands of God. Their duty is 
to relieve tractable suffering when it serves no goals 
which their patients cannot be persuaded rationally 
to adopt as their own, i.e. no purposes to which they 
do not give their voluntary and informed consent. 
The question of whether suffering should be al- 
lowed to take place for soul making purposes should 
not be confused with the question of whether there 
might be other reasons for not attempting to relieve 
some pains of soul. Consider the commonplace prac- 
tice of attempting to subdue with tranquilizers the 
grief of a person who has just lost a loved one. That 
such grief is not inherently desirable may be seen in 
many ways. We could agree that it would have been 
better for the loved one not to be lost at all, or that 
we should leave it to God and not to ourselves to 
inflict such grief, or that we should think of Heaven 
as a place where there will be no more such painful 
separations. We should not inflict grief that others 
might grow, but grief often seems inescapable in our 
world of woe, given our psychological constitution. If 
tranquilizers actually provide an escape from the 
inescapable, then they should be used. However. 
there is grave factual question about whether they 
really are effective in the long run. Grief will out in 
one way or at one time or another, so it seems. If it 
is not expressed and discharged immediately follow- 
ing the loss of an object of deep affection, repressed 
grief will likely be psychologically incapacitating in 
some frustrating respects until at some later time it 
erupts with even greater violence. These later expres- 
sions of grief are even more difficult to deal with 
because they occur at socially inappropriate times 
when those who would give social support and 
comfort during a normal period of grief are no longer 
available. If, as it seems. there is no way to avoid 
doing our grief work. then doing it immediately 
following a loss seems to be the lesser of the evils. 
Administering tranquilizers falls on the side of the 
greater of the evils, not because it interferes with soul 
making, but because in the long run it creates more 
pains of soul than it eases. Thus. they should not be 
used to subdue grief. 
INFORMED CONSENT AND REFUSAL 
Now I would like to make a few concluding 
remarks about a principle which is now generally 
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regarded as one of the most fundamental principles 
of medical ethics. the principle of voluntary informed 
consent. The relevance of this principle to the topic 
of pain management has been much too little ex- 
plored. I earlier noted that attempts to fulfill the 
obligation to relieve unnecessary pain should be 
subject to the informed consent of the patient. Now 
we must confront this qualification. 1 shall not ex- 
plore in any depth the question of the theoretical 
foundations of the informed consent principle, 
though I will mention that it is deeply rooted in the 
significance attached to the dignity and autonomy of 
the individual in democratic societies, and to the fact 
that loss or lack of control over our destiny through 
the tyranny and coercion of others generates ome of 
the most insufferable pains of soul that persons can 
ever suffer. For medical professionals, the self- 
protective interest in avoiding prosecution for mal- 
practice or for assault and battery is also pertinent 
here. 
The principle of voluntary informed consent as 
applied to the competent adult person says that it is 
wrong to subject any such person to diagnostic, 
therapeutic. or experimental medical procedures to 
which he has not knowingly and freely consented. 
This principle places upon medical personnel the duty 
to give patients adequate information about the 
nature of such procedures, their probable risks, 
benefits, costs, consequences, alternatives, etc. and 
the duty to obtain the consent of the patient without 
undue influence, threat, incentive, or coercion. It 
logically implies a strong priwmfucie right to refuse 
any medical procedure to which the patient has not 
freely given his informed consent. In democratic 
societies. this principle now has the status of law as 
well as the support of broadly based moral con- 
viction. 
It is very understandable that many medical pro- 
fessionals find it hard to accept and apply the prin- 
ciple of informed consent. This is so partly because 
of difficulties in determining how much information 
they need to supply and an unwillingness to expend 
the time and effort required to supply it. The principle 
also requires them to cease being paternalistic and to 
give up the long cherished attitude that ‘the doctor 
always knows best’. This attitude is usually justified 
concerning knowledge of tke means to medical ends, 
but it is not valid with respect o the choice of rhe ends 
themselves. Here patient input is essential and should 
be the last word where none of the overriding condi- 
tions which I shall mention shortly obtain. At any 
rate, there is a great need for a clear answer to the 
following questions: Just how much autonomy in 
controlling the means to pain management and relief 
should be placed in the hands of the patient? Corre- 
spondingly, how much paternalism in this matter 
should doctors and supporting staff be willing to 
surrender? 
One sphere where practical decisions are greatly 
affected by how we answer such questions is that of 
allowing chronic pain patients to have more control 
over the administration of pain control medication. 
Most of us want to acknowledge paternalistically that 
some limits have to be placed on patient control in 
the interest of avoiding addiction, and most of us 
recognizing that even this matter less and less as 
death draws nearer and nearer. We should recognize 
as well that the anxieties generated by being totally 
at the mercy of others with regard to the means of 
pain relief are often overwhelming and that these 
anxieties tend to magnify the very pain itself (local- 
ized) that needs to be eased. The other side of this 
coin is that such anxieties and amplifications may be 
largely avoided by allowing the patient to make his 
own properly informed decisions concerning the 
quantity and timing of pain relief medication. The 
possibility of patient abuse in this area is considerably 
less than many have feared especially since being in 
control diminishes pain. Where overmedication is a 
problem, we should take a careful look at the value 
laden concept of ‘overmedication’, which means: too 
much medicine-in relation to whose goals or values? 
Giving patients more control over the means to 
pain relief becomes a very urgent issue where life and 
death are at stake. In applying the principle of 
informed consent and the corresponding right to 
refuse treatment to competent adult patients over- 
whelmed by pain, we might ask whether they would 
apply with different degrees of force to: (1) those 
whose death is imminent and who would prefer to die 
even sooner rather than submit to additional painful 
medical procedures or to prolonged and intense 
intractible pain generated by the injury or illness itself 
and (2) those who are in no imminent danger of death 
if treated, but who refuse to endure those natural and 
iatrogenic pains of body and soul which they must 
endure if they continue to live. 
For patients in imminent danger of death, the 
choice of death has always been an effective means to 
the end of pain relief. Robert M. Veatch has pointed 
out that the first legal decision made in the United 
States respecting the right to refuse treatment was 
made in just such a case. In 1971 Mrs Carmen 
Martinez, a seventy-two-year-old Florida resident, 
was dying of hemolytic anemia. “Medical sci- 
ence . . . could not provide a cure, but it could offer 
continua1 transfusions to prolong the dying process. 
To facilitate the blood transfer, Mrs Martinez’s veins 
had to be opened surgically in a process doctors 
called ‘cutdowns’. ‘Please don’t torture me any more’, 
she begged”. The courts at first judged her to be 
incompetent, but then her daughter who had been 
appointed her guardian “also begged the judge, ‘No 
more cutdowns’“. As Veatch characterized the 
judge’s final decision, “A compassionate judge ruled 
for the first time in American legal history that the 
medical system may and must honor the daughter’s 
demand that the torture be stopped” [SO]. Untreated, 
Mrs Martinez died within twenty-four hours. I sus- 
pect that most of us would agree with this judge’s 
decision, but in this sort of case the woman’s age and 
the proximity and inevitability of her death probably 
has a lot to do with our attitudes. 
The degree.of our commitment to the principle of 
informed consent and the right to refuse treatment is 
most severely tested by those whose lives can be 
indefinitely prolonged by medical science but who 
judge that their pains of soul and/or body are and will 
be so unendurable that death is preferable to treat- 
ment. Such situations may be relatively rare, but they 
do occur. For example, young patients who are 
severely burned may have a good prospect for con- 
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tinued life and even some semblance of health, but 
they may prefer to die rather than submit to excru- 
ciatingly painful and endlessly prolonged therapies 
and a significantly diminished quality of life [51]. 
Many other kinds of patients also choose to trade off 
great quantities of life in exchange for pain relief [52]. 
Although my view is controversial, I am convinced 
that patients in our second category have an ex- 
tremely strong prima facie right to refuse treatment 
too painful to bear or which would prolong a life too 
painful to endure. May this basic right ever be justly 
overridden? Both the law and the enlightened moral 
conscience would I believe, recognize the following 
conditions which set aside or override the principle of 
informed consent and the right to refuse treatment: 
(1) where the patient is in an emergency situation 
and is unconscious, confused or so overwhelmed by 
his immediate pain that he may be presumed not to 
be sufficiently rational to decide his ultimate fate; 
(2) where the patient’s condition presents a clear 
and present danger to others, either of violent assault 
or of serious communicable disease; 
(3) where other persons, such as children, depend 
so heavily on the patient that the state has a compel- 
ling interest in preserving the patient’s life, though 
here we might want to be sure that the most im- 
portant of these responsibilities could not be met in 
some other way. 
(4) where the patient is a minor, though here there 
is the borderline case of the exceptionally mature 
minor; and proxies may refuse treatment on grounds 
of unendurable pain, as they may in the following 
situation; 
(5) where the patient is mentally incompetent to 
understand his own circumstances or incapable of 
making decisions; 
(6) where sufficient efforts have not been made to 
insure that the patient is adequately informed, or 
where it appears that the patient is acting under 
duress. In other words, where it is not clear that the 
patient is capable of giving informed voluntary con- 
sent or refusal. 
Given my utilitarian leanings in moral philosphy, 
I would like to add a final condition for consid- 
eration, though I am sure that those who attach 
absolute value to individual autonomy will promptly 
reject it after they consider it. Finally, a patient’s 
refusal of treatment may be overturned; 
(7) where a review committee [53] determines in 
conference and on the basis of a careful and impartial 
review of the patient’s realistic prospects for suffering 
and for a meaningful future existence, that overriding 
his immediate wishes will be significantly less harmful 
in the long run to his essential. interests than the 
suffering which he must endure. An example might be 
the case of a young and otherwise healthy burn 
patient who refuses treatment needed to save his life 
even though he will likely suKer from no permanent 
disfigurement or disability once treatment is com- 
pleted. 
Though the seventh condition will have only ex- 
tremely rare applications, if any at all, and though the 
sixth condition may seem redundant, I believe that it 
is legitimate and highly desirable up to a point to 
challenge the patient’s life endangering refusal to 
endure pain. In particular cases, the patient reallq 
may not be capable of knowing what he is doing or 
able to make that ideal decision which a ‘reasonable 
person’ would make; or he may be too susceptible to 
nonrational or coercive influences, such as pain itself 
or his awareness that his family wants him to die so 
they can inherit his fortune. Proper procedural safe- 
guards for the protection of both the patient and the 
medical staff should always be provided. Also. the 
most objectionable features of blatant medical pater- 
nalism must be avoided by the introduction of a 
collective rational decision procedure designed to 
insure that any decisions reached will have the highest 
degree of objective and interpersonal validity which 
it is humanly possible to achieve. In applying the 
seventh criterion, the patient’s own judgment must be 
given the benefit of every serious doubt, and only 
where it can be determined that the patient’s essential 
interests will obviously be best protected by pre- 
serving life should a review committee decide to 
override. Appealing to a review committee will be 
especially useful where a patient does not want to 
submit to painful therapy but also does not want to 
die, or where the patient’s own attitudes are so 
ambivalent that they cannot be determined [54]. 
After proper allowances have been made for all the 
foregoing overriding conditions, a substantial num- 
ber of cases will still remain in which no reasonable 
doubt can be sustained that the patient is acting 
freely, knowingly and rationally in refusing life pro- 
longing therapy on the grounds that the life so 
prolonged will be unacceptably painful, both phys- 
ically and/or mentally. Such a patient must be al- 
lowed to die, but no dying person should be allowed 
to suffer from such pains of soul as a sense of 
alienation from the human community or a fear of 
abandonment as the end comes. Those who refuse life 
saving therapy should still be offered any of the 
comforts of medication and the solace of the presence 
of medical personnel and loved ones that they will 
accept. The ethics of voluntary informed consent and 
refusal provides a clear ethical rationale for passive 
euthanasia in such instances. Though it is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is quite possible that the ethics 
of pain relief further requires assistance in auto- 
euthanasia, and even active euthanasia, in extreme 
cases [55]. 
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